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Over the past several decades, there has emerged a rough consensus among professional 
antitrust practitioners, and within the law and economics community generally, that the 
Acompetition@ referred to in our antitrust statutes is not to be interpreted simply as pre-merger 
rivalry among entities.  Rather, it is best viewed as a process, the outcome of which is welfare, 
with welfareBnot Arivalry@--being the object of interest.   Consistent with this interpretation, 
scholars, competition authorities, and the courts have come to treat antitrust law as condemning 
only those mergers whose effect may be substantially to reduce welfare.  
 
  That having been said, there remains a question of  which welfare standard to use, and 
exactly whose welfare to consider.   Several candidates suggest themselves.  I argue in this paper 
for using the so-called ATotal Welfare@ standard, rather than the more commonly employed 
"Consumer Welfare" standard.  In doing so, I respond to three broad objections that have been 
raised.  One is that use of a total welfare standard conflicts with antitrust law, or at least with 
legal precedent.  A second is that employing a total welfare standard would be more costly for 
antitrust agencies than employing one or another flavor of a consumer welfare standard.  A third 
is that the total welfare standard ignores important distributional considerationsBconsiderations 
that are better treated under some form of consumer welfare standard.   Each of these objections 
is evaluated, and ultimately found unpersuasive.  
 
 
  Antitrust agencies in the U.S., and increasingly around the world, have adopted what has 
been termed the consumer welfare standard for analyzing proposed mergers.  For example, in a 
recent article, the then-Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and currently Assistant Attorney 
General of the United States Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice stated, “Today, most 
would agree that proper enforcement of the antitrust laws focuses on consumer welfare.” He 
added that “the enforcement authorities in the United States look most frequently at the question 
of what is best for consumers.”
1 And, in a speech given shortly after succeeding Mario Monti as 
Competition Commissioner for the EU, Ms. Neelie Kroes observed that “Consumer welfare is 
now well established as the standard the Commission applies when assessing mergers and 
infringements of the Treaty rules on cartels and monopolies. Our aim is simple: to protect 
competition in the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and ensuring an efficient 
allocation of resources.”
2   
 
  Under the consumer welfare standard, if a merger appears likely to harm consumers as a 
result of a reduction in competition--some would add Asignificantly@-- in any relevant market, the 
merger is illegal.
3 This article considers the basis for applying a consumer welfare standard, and 
examines the arguments for instead employing a total welfare standardBi.e., a standard that 
considers a merger=s likely effect on all members of society, not simply the consumers of 
products produced by the merging firms.
4 
 
  As an initial matter, it is quite clear that the relevant sections of U.S. antitrust law say 
nothing about welfareBconsumer or otherwise.  Rather, they state that mergers are illegal when 
their effect Amay substantially reduce competition in any line of commerce.@   
 
                                                 
1 Thomas O. Barnett, Columbia Business Law Review, 2004 Milton Handler Antitrust Review, Volume 2005, 
Number 2  pp. 295-298.  Barnett states explicitly that “The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the 
author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.”   
2 Neelie Kroes, European Competition Commissioner:  Presentation: European Competition Policy – Delivering 
Better Markets and Better Choices. European Consumer and Competition Day, London, Sept. 5, 2005.   
3 As discussed below, U.S. competition agencies will at times consider efficiencies “not strictly in the relevant 
market, but so inextricably linked with it that a partial divestiture or other remedy could not feasibly eliminate the 
anticompetitive effect in the relevant market without sacrificing the efficiencies in the other market(s).”   
4 This article does not address the proper welfare standard to apply in the case of civil non-merger investigations, 
such as those implicated by Section 2 of the Sherman Act or Article 82 of the EC’s competition law.  While in 
principle the economic case for a total welfare standard would seem to be equally applicable outside the narrow 
setting of merger policy, issues such as ease of application, among others, distinguish the two situations.  For 
discussions of the appropriate standard to apply outside the merger setting, see Werden, Gregory, “Identifying 
Exclusionary Conduct under Section 2: The "No Economic Sense" Test,” 73 Antitrust Law Journal (Forthcoming 
2006) and Salop, Steven C., "Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice 
Standard.”  Antitrust Law Journal, (Forthcoming 2006).  Neither, I would note, proposes that total welfare 
maximization be the test.      
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  Over the past several decades, there has emerged a rough consensus among professional 
antitrust practitioners, and within the law and economics community generally, that the 
Acompetition@ referred to in our antitrust statutes is not to be interpreted simply as pre-merger 
rivalry among entities.  Rather, it is best viewed as a process, the outcome of which is welfare, 
with welfareBnot Arivalry@--being the object of interest.   Consistent with this interpretation, 
scholars, competition authorities, and the courts have come to treat antitrust law as condemning 
only those mergers whose effect may be substantially to reduce welfare.  
 
  That having been said, there remains a question of  which welfare standard to use, and 
exactly whose welfare to consider.   Several candidates suggest themselves.  One is the welfare 
of consumers in each of the markets potentially impacted by the merger.  Under this standard, a 
merger is permissible if (and only if) our analysis predicts that consumers in each and every one 
of the markets at issue are likely to be at least as well off after the merger as they were before it.  
One might call this an AActual Pareto@ consumer welfare standard, though for reasons explained 
below, applying this standard does not necessarily ensure that each and every consumer will be 
made better off. 
 
  A second approach would be to permit mergers whose net effect on consumers across all 
the (possibly multiple) markets served by the merging parties is positive.  Using this standard, a 
merger would be permitted even if consumers are harmed in market A, so long as the benefits 
received by consumers in other markets served by the merging firms—consumers in markets B, 
C ... Z, are in aggregate greater.  One might refer to this as a APotential Pareto@ consumer welfare 
standard. 
 
  A third approach, one that has not, to my knowledge, been adopted clearly and explicitly 
by any major competition authority, is to permit mergers whose predicted effect on the total 
welfare of members of society as a whole is positive.
5   Application of this standard requires that 
weight be given not only to the welfare of those who consume the merging firm=s products, but 
also to those doing the producing.
6  
                                                 
5 The welfare standard employed in Canada lies somewhere between a consumer and a total welfare approach.  
Section 96 (1) of the 1986 Competition Act of Canada explicitly provides for an “efficiencies defense” for mergers 
that might result in higher prices for consumers.  For an excellent discussion of the Superior Propane case, other 
recent Canadian court decisions, and an economic analysis of Canada’s efficiency defense, see Thomas W. Ross & 
Ralph A. Winter, “The Efficiency Defense in Merger Law:  Economic Foundations and Recent Canadian 
Developments,” 72 Antitrust Law Journal, 471-505 (2005).  See also the discussion contained in Report of the 
Advisory Panel on Efficiencies, August, 2005, submission to Scott Sheridan, Commissioner of Competition 
specifically those relating to the controversial merger between Superior Propane Inc. and ICG Propane Inc., have 
ruled, however, that where a merger appears likely to raise prices to consumers, an efficiencies defense must employ 
a so-called “balancing weights” approach—i.e., an approach in which harm to low-income consumers is afforded 
disproportionately greater weight.    
6 Although those most directly affected by a merger, and those for whom the merger’s likely effects may be easiest 




  In one very real sense, an economy=s producers are consumers as well, albeit consumers of 
many items other than the ones they happen to produce.  There is, of course, a difference between 
the act of consuming and the act of producing, and most individuals in our highly specialized 
economy do not restrict themselves to consuming only what they themselves produce; they 
enhance one another’s welfare through trade.  This distinction, however, hardly suggest a 
meaningful basis for weighting the welfare of individuals occupying these two roles 
unequallyBmuch less, weighting the welfare of a market=s producers at zero when determining 
whether a merger is, on balance, beneficial to society.  In any event, it seems reasonable to place 
the burden of proof on those who would defend the use of a narrower, so-called  Aconsumer 
welfare@ standard, rather than a total welfare standard that accounts for the well being of all of an 
economy=s members.  As discussed below, it is far from clear that this burden has been carried. 
 
  This paper makes a case for employing the so-called ATotal Welfare@ standard.  In the 
course of doing so, it responds to a number of possible defenses for antitrust=s current exclusive 
focus on the welfare of consumers in the relevant markets impacted directly by proposed mergers.  
 
  The issue is not a new one.  In 1968, Oliver Williamson famously described, using what 
he termed AThe Naive Tradeoff Model,@ the tradeoff that arises when a merger simultaneously 
produces cost savings--from realization of efficiencies--and higher pricesBfrom greater market 
power.
7  
                                                                                                                                                               
welfare of any and all who may be affected by the merger.  This includes, in principle, the welfare of those who 
compete against the merging firms and, to the extent higher profits are shared with them, the workers at firms whose 
profits are affected.  I do not, in this article, consider the effect of mergers on consumers, producers, or workers in 
countries outside of the competition authority’s jurisdiction.    
7Merging firms may be made better off in yet another way that can leave consumers worse off.  Consider a situation 
where two duopolists had been colluding—tacitly, perhaps.  If a merger makes it easier for them to price 
discriminate, this may leave consumers worse off (though it may also leave them better off).  It will, in any event, 





  Williamson went on to present what he termed Aillustrative@ results, showing that it may 
take very small percentage cost savings to completely offset the negative welfare effects of even a 
significant increase in market power.   Indeed, much of the subsequent commentary on 
Williamson=s influential article dealt more with the implicit assumptions that generated this 
contentious result, than with the proposal that merger policy employ a total, rather than a 
consumer, welfare standard.
8   
 
                                                 
8 See Oliver E. Williamson. AEconomies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs.@ 58 American Economic 
Review. 1, 18-36 (1968).  In responding to critics and qualifying his admittedly naive model, Williamson recognized 
that accurately measuring a merger=s net effect on total welfare properly incorporates any losses in producer surplus--
which occur when, as is commonly the case, the merging firms were setting price above marginal cost even before 
exercising greater market power post-merger.  Williamson concluded that adjusting for this did not materially affect 
his conclusions.  For criticisms of Williamson’s original article, see Michael E. DePrano and Jeffrey B. Nugent. 
“Economies as an Antitrust Defense: Comment.” 59 The American Economic Review. 5, 947-953 (1969). Alan A. 
Fisher and Robert H. Lande, “Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement.” 71 California Law Review. 6, 1580-
1696 (1983).  For responses by Williamson to his critics, see Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: Reply.” 
59 The American Economic Review. 5, 954-959 (1969) and “Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited,” 125 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review. 4, 669-736 (1977).   For a more recent treatment of similar issues, see L.H. 
Roller, J. Stennek and F. Verboven. “Efficiency Gains from Mergers” Working Paper No. 543. Industrial Institute for 




Welfare and Efficiency 
 
  The concepts of economic welfare and economic efficiency are closely related to one 
another.  Economists say that an economy is operating at maximum efficiency when society is 
squeezing the greatest value—the highest level of welfare--out of its scarce resources.  The 
independent actions of profit and utility-maximizing economic agents work towards producing this 
desirable outcome in ways that are familiar to students of elementary microeconomics.     
Competition among firms to obtain the patronage of consumers spurs them to produce those goods 
and services that are most highly valued by consumers, to do so at the lowest possible cost (for 
example, by finding ways of producing the same quantity of output with fewer inputs), and to 
drive prices down towards the marginal cost of production (thereby resulting in output up to the 
point at which additional value to consumers no longer exceeds the additional cost to society).   In 
this way, competition works--Aas if by an invisible hand@ as Adam Smith famously observed--to 
squeeze the greatest possible value out of society=s scarce resources. 
 
  One of the ways in which production costs are minimized is by efficiently combining the 
inputs that produce the goods and services we ultimately consume.  The entities that typically 
accumulate and process inputs into final products are called firms, though at times inputs may be 
combined by independent agents through arms-length contracts with one another.   Firms will at 
times seek to grow through merger, though an alternative may be to grow Ainternally,@ or perhaps 
to expand via arms-length contracts with other, still independent, firms. 
 
Mergers and Efficiency  
 
  Getting a product to market involves a number of discrete, yet critical, steps.  These steps 
may include some or all of the following:  basic research, applied research, product design, product 
manufacture, marketing, distribution, service.  Not uncommonly, firms that produce final products 
in close competition with one another have different strengths and weaknesses in these various 
steps.  Auto Firm A, for example, may be better than auto Firm B when it comes to coming up 
with innovative ideas and quality control, while auto Firm B may be better than auto Firm A when 
it comes to marketing and post-sale servicing.  Combining the best of both can produce synergies, 
which in principle permit lower-cost production of an even better product.
9   
 
  It is useful to discuss briefly why contracts that maintain the independenceBespecially the 
pricing independenceBof two competitors with relatively different strengths will not always be a 
feasible or equally efficient method of obtaining the economic benefits expected from merger.
   
                                                 
9 Many of these essentially “complementary” efficiencies may be available only by merging the operations of 
competitors.    
  6
 
Industrial organization economists have, at least since publication of Ronald Coase=s landmark 
article on the theory of the firm, been intrigued with the question of when and why the costs of 
organizing transactions within firms will tend to be lower than the costs of organizing transactions 
across entities via contract.
10  Several decades after the appearance of Coase=s article, work by 
others, particularly Oliver Williamson, put more theoretical flesh on the bare bones that Coase had 
first exposed.
11  Over time, a number of industry studies provided a degree of empirical support for 
today=s commonly accepted notion that transactions organized within a firm can in many cases 
economize greatly on the transactions costs associated with writing, monitoring and enforcing 
contracts.
12   While important theoretical questions about the efficiency of operations even within a 
firm continue to be studied, there is little disagreement that it will frequently be less costly to 
conduct transactions within a firm than to do so across firms.  And unless it is equally costly for a 
firm to grow internally rather than through acquisition, this implies that cost savings may be 
merger-specific.  In other words, merger will at times be the most efficient means through which 
firms satisfy the demands of consumers.   
 
  A merger can be thought of as a special sort of contract, an Aall-encompassing@ one, if you 
will, whereby the decisions of two formerly independent firms will be subject to the authority of a 
single entity.  Or, put differently, where two formerly independent firms Acontract@ to become a 
single firm.  Firms may merge to obtain greater market power.  They may also merge to achieve 
efficienciesBi.e. to reduce costs.
13 The efficiencies potentially realizable through merger are 
numerous, as are the means through which these benefits can be achieved.
14 
 
  Broadly speaking, efficiencies will tend often to take either of two forms: ones that lower 
marginal production costs, and ones that generate savings in fixed costs.  Efficiencies can lower 
                                                 
10 See Coase, R.H. “The Nature of the Firm.” 4 Economica, New Series. 16, 386-405 (1937). 
11 See Oliver E. Williamson. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. New York: The Free 
Press, 1975. 
12 See Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford, and Armen Alchian. “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the 
Competitive Contracting Process.” 21 Journal of Law and Economics. 2, 297-326 (1978). See also Russell Pittman. 
“Specific Investments, Contracts, and Opportunism: The Evolution of Railroad Sidetrack Agreements,” 34 Journal 
of Law and Economics. University of Chicago Press. 2, 565-589 (1992) and Paul L. Joskow “Contract Duration and 
Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets.” 77 The American Economic Review. 
1, 168-185 (1987). 
13  I am referring here to a lowering of the cost function, not to a reduction of costs that occurs purely as a consequence 
of reducing quality or output.  
14 This raises a question of how to treat reductions in marginal cost that arise because of procurement cost savings.  
The answer is that procurement cost savings that arise because of resource cost savings—e.g., fewer resources required 
when there are longer production runs—are welfare-enhancing.  Indeed, they are efficiencies that likely result in 
greater output as well.  Procurement cost savings that arise from merger-generated monoposony power, however, are 
less likely to generate increases in welfare.  Unless the exercise in monopsony power is offsetting pre-existing market 
power on the selling side, these benefits to the merged firm will likely result in lower output, and will in any event 
result in inefficient production of pre-merger levels of output.       
7
 
the cost of producing existing products.  They can also promote the development of entirely new or 
better products.  One way in which this latter type of benefit—so-called “Dynamic” efficiencies--
can in theory be enhanced is for merging firms to eliminate redundant R&D activities and instead 
allocate the firms’ limited assets towards multiple, alternative, projects.  Dynamic efficiencies may 
themselves be realized in a variety of ways, and one may ask whether efficiencies that make 
innovative activity more likely to occur, or likely to occur at lower cost, are more properly viewed 
as fixed cost savings or marginal cost savings.   The important point is that whatever label one 
applies, and regardless of how the benefits from dynamic efficiencies are split between lowering 
prices and developing entirely new products or processes, dynamic efficiency generates an 
increase in total welfare.
15     
 
  Distinctions between fixed and marginal cost tend to be particularly important when 
competition authorities employ a consumer, rather than a total, welfare standard.  The reason is as 
follows:  unlike changes in marginal cost, changes in fixed cost generally do not alter the firm=s 
profit-maximizing price, or the level of output at which the firm maximizes its profits, unless they 
affect the firm=s very viability.
16 As a result, pure fixed cost changes, no matter how large, may 
have no effect at all on the welfare of consumers in the relevant market.
17  In terms of their effect on 
a firm’s profit-maximizing price, higher fixed costs can be compared with someone breaking into 
the company=s headquarters and stealing a large sum of money from the firm=s safe.  Conversely, 
lower fixed costs are akin to some anonymous benefactor depositing a large sum of money into the 
firm=s bank account.  In the first case the firm is worse off, and in the second it is better off, yet in 
                                                 
15 Another oft-cited category of possible efficiencies from merger is realization of scale economies.  For reasons given 
in Farrell and Shapiro, however, achieving through merger pure scale economies will often not be merger-specific.  Or 
if it is, the fact that the merging firms hadn’t been achieving these efficiencies without merging may suggest strongly 
that the market is not performing competitively.  Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro. “Scale Economies and Synergies in 
Horizontal Merger Analysis.” 68 Antitrust Law Journal. 685-710 (2001). Roller et al (op.cit.) categorize potential 
efficiencies from merger as either rationalization, economies of scale, technological progress, purchasing economies, 
and reduction of slack (managerial and X-efficiency).   See also William J. Kolasky and Andrew R. Dick. “The 
Merger Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers,” 71 Antitrust Law 
Journal. 207-252 (2003).  
16 Although it sometimes surprises attorneys to hear it, reducing the marginal cost of even a monopolist makes it 
profitable for the monopolist to reduce price and increase output.  Fixed cost savings do not have this effect.  These 
implications flow from the fact that demand curves slope downward, and firms maximize profits by setting marginal 
revenue equal to marginal cost. 
17 Under a consumer welfare standard, even fixed cost savings would properly be given some weight if they were 
ultimately passed along to consumers in the form of lower prices.  Arguing that all costs must be recovered in the long 
run, some would contend that fixed cost savings would, eventually, be reflected in lower prices.  This intuition no 
doubt provides part of the rationale for the willingness of the U.S. antitrust agencies, as reflected in the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines, to “consider the effects of cognizable efficiencies with no short-term, direct effect on prices in the 
relevant market.” The extent to which fixed cost savings actually will be passed through, and how quickly that might 
occur, will depend at least in part on the strength of competition post merger.  
  8
 
neither case is there reason to expect a change in the price the firm finds it most profitable to set, or 
the level of output the firm finds it most profitable to produce. 
 
  Importantly, however, unlike in the case of pure money transfers, fixed cost savings have 
significant efficiency implications for the economy as a whole.  As discussed below, by freeing up 
resources for use elsewhere in the economy, fixed cost savings enhance an economy’s total welfare.  
These potential benefits from merger are given zero weight when applying a narrow consumer 
welfare standard.
 18   
 
The Actual Pareto Consumer Welfare Standard 
 
  As an initial matter, when a merger has no effect other than to lower the (quality-adjusted) 
price for final goods sold in a market, some consumers in that market will benefit and no 
consumers will be harmed.   Those who had been consuming the product before the merger will be 
able to purchase their original quantities at a lower price, and additional surplus will be obtained 
by consumers who, at the now-lower price, consume even greater quantities than before.  In 
addition, individuals who had in the past maximized their utility by consuming zero quantities of 
the product may be better off by making some purchases at the now-lower price.  Thus, all 
consumers of the product appear to be better off.   
 
  Even in the case of price-lowering mergers, however, it will not necessarily be true that all 
consumers everywhere will be better off.  An efficient merger may drive one or more rivals out of 
business, and consumers who preferred the version offered by exiting rivals may now find 
themselves worse off.  Related to this point, efficiencies sometimes arise from combining 
complementary assets and standardizing on a single platform or a single standard.  Where the two 
merging firms had previously been offering competing and incompatible methods of satisfying 
consumers, efficient standardization will typically strand the investments of consumers who had 
invested in the to-be-jettisoned standard.  They will be left worse off, even though consumers in 
                                                 
18 The Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 
outline the approach to efficiencies taken by the U.S. federal competition authorities.  They state, “The Agency will 
not challenge a merger if cognizable efficiencies [i.e., efficiencies that are merger-specific, that have been verified and 
do not arise from anticompetitive reductions in output or service] are of a character and magnitude such that the 
merger is not likely to be anticompetitive in any relevant market.”  In a footnote, the Guidelines go on to qualify this 
statement by noting that, although the Agency generally focuses on whether cognizable efficiencies likely would be 
sufficient to prevent even short-term price increases in the relevant market, “The Agency also will consider the effects 
of cognizable efficiencies with no short-term, direct effect on prices in the relevant market,” though the Guidelines 
state that benefits from such efficiencies “will be given less weight because they are less proximate and more difficult 
to predict.”  This qualification explicitly permits U.S. competition authorities, under some limited circumstances, to 
depart from what I am referring to as the consumer welfare standard.   Nevertheless, neither the U.S. competition 
authorities, much less the competition authorities in most other economies, appear willing to adopt explicitly and 
unambiguously a total welfare standard for merger enforcement.   
9
 
the market as a whole are better off from having a better, cheaper, more ubiquitous standard as a 
result of the merger.    
 
  Producers in the relevant market(s) may be either better off, or worse off.  Certainly the 
merging firms believe that they will be better off, as evidenced by the fact that they=ve chosen to 
merge—presumably, voluntarily.  Rivals of the merging firms are likely to be harmed, since a 
price-lowering merger may well force them to compete harder, perhaps by lowering their own 
prices, and they may well lose business to the more efficient merged firm.  In addition, firms not 
even in the relevant market may be worse off to the extent that demand for their product falls when 
consumer patronage shifts to products whose price has fallen as a result of the merger.  While 
these latter categories of producers are worse off—indeed, producers may collectively be worse 
off—an Actual Pareto Consumer Welfare Standard would bless the merger.   
 
  As emphasized recently in work by Steve Salop,  merger-generated efficiencies can in 
theory actually lower total welfare—as a consequence of shifting sales towards the merging parties 
and away from their rivals.
19  Salop presents an example where two relatively high-cost firms with 
relatively small shares achieve marginal cost savings through merger.  As a consequence of 
lowering their marginal cost, they reduce price somewhat.  This, in turn, results in greater sales for 
them and lower sales for what may be a (still) more efficient rival.
20  Although the reduction in the 
merged firm’s marginal cost will likely lead to at least somewhat greater sales in the relevant 
product market, the pre-merger level of output will be produced at higher total cost.  In such a 
circumstance, the net effect would be gains for consumers, but quite possibly lower total welfare--
after one adjusts for the net negative effect on producers as a whole. 
 
  Scenarios such as this may or may not be rare, yet they represent another category of 
cases—ones where prices are actually lowered by a merger—in which application of a pure 
consumer welfare standard would be costly to the economy as a whole.  Taking fully into account 
such possibilities—akin in certain respects to “second best” considerations
21--may be very difficult 
in practice; however, the example alerts us to the possibility that looking only at a merger’s effect 
on the welfare of consumers and the merging firms can be too narrow a focus if it ignores 
                                                 
19 Submission of Steve Salop to the Antitrust Modernization Commission dated 11/4/05; “Question:  What is the Real 
and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard?  Answer:  The True Consumer Welfare Standard”. 
20 In answer to the question “How do higher-cost firms manage to survive in the market?” Salop suggests that it may 
be because they provide a differentiated product.  To the extent that consumers value the particular variety produced 
by the “high cost” firms, Salop may not be making the point as strongly as he might.  Given that many oligopoly 
models—Cournot among them—generate equilibria where the lowest cost firm finds it profitable to price high enough 
to keep its rivals viable, the general point can be made even more strongly by simply assuming that all firms in the 
market produce and sell a homogenous product.  
21 R. G. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster. “The General Theory of Second Best.” 24 Review of Economic Studies 1, 11-
32 (1957).  
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inefficient shifts in production across firms and leads one falsely to conclude that a merger has 
raised total welfare, when in fact it has not.  The original Williamson diagram, therefore, suggests 




Fixed Cost Savings and Total Welfare 
 
  There are any number of situations in which merging parties anticipate capturing 
efficiencies that, under traditional consumer welfare criteria, would not help them avoid an adverse 
enforcement decision (or court ruling).  Thus, the choice of standard may be of more than simply 
theoretical interest.  Mergers contemplated because they will likely produce significant fixed cost 
savings tend to be of this form.  Consider, for example, the situation where Firm A and Firm B 
compete with differentiated products, and where Firm A happens to have a good deal of unutilized 
capacity in its factory.  The reasons for this disequilibrium state of affairs may be several, but let=s 
assume that the available capacity is temporarily excessive because there has been a significant 
and unanticipated drop in demand for Firm A’s product.
23 
 
  The excess capacity in the hands of Firm A can, let us assume, be used to produce the 
entire projected output of competing Firm B.  In such circumstances—which I suspect are hardly 
unique—consolidating all the production of both firms in the partially vacant plant of Firm A 
would clearly lower the total cost of producing this output.  This is because part of the cost to 
society of producing Firm B=s output in Firm B=s plant is that resources are being used for this 
purpose that could be reallocated elsewhere in the economy, producing a net gain in total welfare.  
In particular, assuming the fixed cost savings are merger-specific, a cost of prohibiting a merger 
between Firms A and B would be the opportunity cost of continuing to run the plant of Firm B.
24 If 
Firm B=s plant would be closed by a merged firm, and particularly if the merged firm would 
continue supplying the market with all or nearly all of both Firm A and Firm B=s pre-merger 
output, economic benefits could be substantial. 
                                                 
22 Though concern for the welfare of parties affected only indirectly by the effects of a merger ought not be irrelevant 
to enforcement decisions, difficulties associated with estimating such effects (which may well be “second order”) 
would seem to argue for imposing a fairly high burden of proof upon those—typically competitors—seeking to have 
competition authorities block mergers on these grounds.  
23 Unused capacity need not, of course, be Aexcess@ in an economic sense.  It may instead be serving a valuable 
function in the event that demand for the firm=s product increases in the next period.  By assumption, I am ruling out 
this explanation.  In addition, the fact that factory capacity is durable implies that the firm cannot readily and 
immediately adjust its capacity to fit the now-smaller projected demand for the output of its product.  Over time, of 
course, firms will adjust their investment decisions to reach a new, long-run equilibrium.  Nevertheless, this will not 
necessarily happen quickly. 
24 As discussed in Farrell and Shapiro (op. cit.), such efficiencies are more likely to be merger-specific when firm A 
can’t simply produce and sell the total output of the two merging firms at constant cost through its own plant.  This 
may be because the products of the merging firms are branded and contracting costs are substantial.   
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  Benefits might consist of the value—net of their production costs—of alternative products 
produced out of the now empty plant.  Or, if the highest alternative use of the plant is to tear it 
down and sell it as scrap, then the value of that scrap (net of demolition costs)—plus the value in 
its highest alternative use of the land upon which the plant currently sits—would represent 
economic benefits from the merger.   These would all be net benefits to the economy—an increase 
in total welfare.  The fact that they do not involve a reduction in the merged firm=s marginal cost—
and thus do not result in any Apass-through@ to the merged firm=s consumers, does not change the 
fact that the merger is welfare-enhancing.
25  Under a consumer welfare standard, the merger would 
be blocked if there is a small increase in market power.   
 
Marginal Cost Savings Not Fully Passed Through 
 
  As discussed above, fixed cost savings tend not to be passed on to consumers in the 
relevant product market(s) at all, while marginal cost savings in markets potentially raising 
competitive concerns generally result in lower prices.  That having been said, the degree of “pass-
through” from mergers that lower marginal costs will differ from case to case, as they are a 
function of many factors—including both demand conditions and the particular oligopoly game 
being played by firms in the market.
26 
 
  Much like fixed cost savings, those marginal cost savings that do not result in lower prices 
are both benefits to society as a whole and, under a consumer welfare standard, not an acceptable 
defense to a transaction that is likely to raise price.         
 
The Benchmark: Total Welfare 
 
  Let us begin with the standard definition of total welfare.  In any single market, total 
welfare is conventionally defined as total surplus—the difference between the value consumers 
place on output, minus what it costs society to produce that output.  Across all markets, total 
welfare is simply the sum of all surplus, irrespective of how it happens to be divided between 
consumers and producers.  In a hypothetical world populated by only a single individual, that 
individual would do best by organizing his or her affairs so as to maximize the total value obtained 
from the scarce resources he or she has to work with.
27 
                                                 
25 Of course, if the marginal cost of production at Firm A=s plant is lower than the marginal cost of production at Firm 
B=s plant, efficiencies would be even greaterBthough in this case we would expect the lower marginal cost of 
production to translate into some pass-through to final consumers and a concomitant increase in consumer surplus 
(i.e.,welfare). 
26 A pure price taker—an “infra marginal producer”—will not find it profitable to pass on in the form of lower prices 
even marginal cost savings.  Rather, it will keep those savings as rents.    




  Adding to the population does not obviously negate this core principle; however, it does 
introduce issues of distributional equity, which I discuss in some detail below.  In any event, the 
difference between the value to consumers and the cost of production is exactly what economists 
mean by total welfare.  From the standpoint of society as a whole, maximizing it would seem, at 
least at a first approximation, to be a desirable objective.  Anything short of this is akin to asking 
society to make do with less, rather than with more.
28 
 
  What reasons might there be for departing from this standard when developing merger 
policy?  We can consider at least three categories of objections.  One is that use of a total welfare 
standard conflicts with antitrust law, or at least with legal precedent.  A second is that employing a 
total welfare standard would be more costly for antitrust agencies than employing one or another 
flavor of a consumer welfare standard.  A third possible objection, one neatly abstracted away 
from in our example of a single individual populating the economy, is that the total welfare 
standard ignores important distributional considerationsBones that are better treated under some 
form of consumer welfare standard.   Each of these objections is evaluated, and ultimately rejected, 
in the analysis below.     
 
Legal Impediments to Use of a Total Welfare Standard?  
 
  Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers, the effect of which Amay substantially 
reduce competition in any line of commerce.@  (emphasis added).  It does not say anything about 
consumers.
29  An argument could certainly be made that the Ain any line of commerce@ language 
implies that mergers are illegal whenever the result is net harm in any relevant market (irrespective 
of whether the net benefits outside of that relevant market would be even greater).  While under 
this argument one might condemn welfare-enhancing mergers whose primary benefit is to 
consumers in some other markets, it does not, by itself, support condemning mergers whose 
                                                 
28 It is worth noting that literal application of a pure consumer welfare standard, as that term is being defined here, 
would appear to immunize consumer buyer groups that exert efficiency-reducing monopsony power over sellers.  I 
suspect that many supporters of a consumer welfare standard for sellers would be uncomfortable applying its logic 
equally to the buyer side of the market.  Moreover, economic cost-benefit analyses of proposed government activities 
and regulations tend to employ a “distribution neutral” framework, though these studies may attempt to estimate, or 
even propose ways of ameliorating, associated distributional consequences.  [cites?] 
 
29 I recognize that there is a literature debating just what objective function those who legislated the Sherman Act were 
really seeking to maximize, and that there are those who feel strongly that the Act was passed to protect the merging 
firms’ consumers.  This article takes no position on the “original intent” of U.S. merger policy’s Founding Fathers.  To 
the extent that legislative history truly presents a bar to use of a total welfare standard, an implication of this article is 
that new legislation to correct this error would be desirable.  In any event, for those countries where there is less 
clearly a legal bar to use of a total welfare standard, such use would be in their economies’ best interest.     
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benefits to some in the relevant market (namely, those producing the goods being consumed), 
exceed the harms to others in the same relevant market (those doing the consuming). 
 
  Only a seemingly arbitrary decision to weigh more heavily the welfare of some individuals 
in society than others would do that.  If, in particular, a merger causes harm to consumers of 
product A and yet the fixed cost savings from no longer producing and selling product A would 
exceed this harm, then treating the welfare of consumers and producers of product A equally 
would seem to imply that the merger enhances (total) welfare Ain a line of commerce.@   
 
  The literal language of Section 7 would seem, if anything, more likely to rule out use of a 
Potential Pareto Consumer Welfare standard than to trump a Total Welfare standard.  In the former 
case, at least the beneficiaries whose gains outweigh the harm to be suffered by individuals within 
a specific line of commerce (or relevant market) are by definition outside that line of commerce.  
Conceivably, therefore, consideration of these benefits might run afoul of the law=s prohibition 
against mergers likely to reduce competition substantially Ain any line of commerce.@   
 
  Nevertheless, the federal antitrust agencies, if not yet the courts, have stated explicitly 
that under certain circumstances they will employ their prosecutorial discretion to not challenge 
such mergers.  In particular, the most recent edition of the DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines observes that: AIn some cases...the Agency in its prosecutorial discretion will consider 
efficiencies not strictly in the relevant market, but so inextricably linked with it that a partial 
divestiture or other remedy could not feasibly eliminate the anticompetitive effect in the relevant 
market without sacrificing the efficiencies in the other market(s).@
30  Incorporating into one=s 
decision-making out-of-market consumer benefits that are inextricably linked to in-market 
consumer harms makes eminent economic sense.  Less clear is why these benefits should, from 
either a legal or an economic perspective, receive greater weight than the benefits to producers--
whether the latter are achieved in-market or out-of-market.  
 
  All of this having been said, the language of the Clayton Act explicitly concerns itself 
with maintaining competition, not welfare.   Doesn’t the concern with competition imply that the 
Clayton Act aims to protect the beneficiaries of competition—consumers?
 31     Perhaps.  And 
                                                 
30 N. 36. 1997 Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines (31). 
31 One might fairly observe that because the law talks about competition, not about benefits, mergers that reduce 
competition—for example, merger to monopoly—are at the heart of the statute’s concerns.  In this respect, use of a 
consumer welfare standard could perhaps be deemed a sensible way of making operational the statute’s notion of 
reduced competition.   On the other hand, to get from “competition” to “consumer welfare” requires the introduction 
of a benefit standard.  Otherwise, the law is only protecting the act of rivalry itself, which as discussed earlier, the 
law has (appropriately, in the view of many) moved beyond.    
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yet, even here the case for a consumer welfare standard is less than clear-cut.  Merger to 
monopoly, for example, reduces competition by definition.
32  Nevertheless, if the merger-
specific marginal cost reductions are large enough, even in these cases the affected consumers 
are better off, and welfare (however defined) rises.  Does the Clayton Act condemn such 
mergers?  Should it do so?  If we agree that the ultimate determinant of whether a merger under 
the law (a law that is conspicuously silent as to the welfare measure it endorses) depends (or 
should depend) on its effect on welfare rather than on competition per se, then it seems fair to 
consider whether the appropriate measure of welfare should be consumer welfare or total 
welfare.  
 
Costs of Change? 
 
  Once a precedent, or a policy, has been around for a sufficiently long period of time, 
individuals are likely to have come to rely upon it.  More specifically and more significantly 
from an economics perspective, the reliance that individuals place upon a longstanding policy 
may have led them to sink investments in anticipation of the precedent not being overturned.  
Both from the standpoint of equity and efficiency, changeBeven change to a Abetter@ policy (or 
standard)Bcan impose significant costs.  Is this consideration likely to present a serious objection 
to shifting from a consumer to a total welfare standard in merger analysis?  It is not likely that it 
would, and the application to merger policy of the so-called Astare decisis@ doctrine seems weak. 
 
  In particular, there seems little reason to believe that a change in standard would cause 
either inefficiency or an inequitable effect on those who have taken past actions in reliance on 
the current standard.  A change in standard would not be applied retroactively to mergers that 
have already been consummated, and on a going forward basis it is hard to imagine significant 
costs of shifting to a total welfare standard for mergers have not yet even been proposed.  We 
hardly have a situation where market participants, relying on the consumer welfare precedent, 
have made significant sunk investments based on the assumption that a consumer welfare 
standard would continue to be used on into the future.  Shifting towards a total welfare standard 
for review of future mergers would seem to provide guidance that is no less clear to potential 
merger parties.  It would also have the added benefit of encouraging an even larger number of 
efficient mergers than have taken place in the past. 
 
  One cost of changing standards would be a need for the antitrust bar, consultants, and 
courts who have become educated in just what does/doesn=t satisfy a consumer welfare test to 
become re-trained in what constitutes an increase in total welfare.  My sense is that these costs 
are likely to be relatively small.   Certainly, they will be far smaller than the costs that were 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
32 And, it certainly satisfies the statute’s concern with mergers that “tend to create a monopoly”.  
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incurred in the course of moving over the past three decades towards a more economics-based 
approach to merger analysis generally. 
 
Relative Costs of Administering the Alternative Standards 
 
  If the costsBto competition agencies, firms, consultants, courts--of employing a total 
welfare standard were likely to be significantly higher than the costs of employing a consumer 
welfare standard, this would be an argument for sticking with what we haveBwarts and all.  It is 
not obvious, however, that this is true.  Indeed, it is plausible that in a significant share of 
investigations it would be easier, rather than more difficult, to employ a total welfare standard.
33   
 
  Supporters of a consumer welfare standard might contend that applying it is fairly simple; 
“All one needs to do is determine whether price will rise or fall.”  Unfortunately, even this is far 
more difficult to determine in practice than it is to state in principle—even if one were to assume 
away the potential for merger-specific improvements in product quality. 
 
  In order to gauge the actual effect on consumers of a product, economists require 
reasonably accurate information about the shape of the demand curve within the relevant range.  
The costs of obtaining reliable information of this sort may be considerable.  Absent this 
information, it is difficult to estimate confidently the extent to which marginal cost savings of any 
given amount will be passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices.
34 
 
  In addition, estimating the price effect from a merger-generated reduction in marginal cost 
of any given amount requires information about the competitive Agame@ being played by market 
participants.   Cournot, Bertrand, and other specific types of oligopolistic competition have 
different implications for the extent of pass-through from a given cost reduction, just as they have 
different implications for the extent to which a merger will enhance market power.  And, all of this 
is complicated even more by the fact that the type of competitive game being played may itself 
                                                 
33 In deciding how much weight to be given “administrative ease” when deciding upon a welfare standard, one should 
be mindful of the old saw about looking under a street lamp for one’s lost keys simply because the light there is better.  
34 Werden, however, shows that in the case of differentiated products where merger leads to neither enhancements in 
quality nor changes in differentiation (such as, through repositioning), the marginal cost reduction necessary to offset 
the anticompetitive effect is independent of the shape of demand; it depends only on margins and diversion ratios.  
And, accurate information about these variables may be easier to obtain than information about demand.  Werden 
further argues that, in these circumstances, a very large reduction in marginal cost is generally required to offset the 
price-increasing effects of an otherwise anticompetitive merger.  See Gregory J. Werden. “A Robust Test for 
Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers Among Sellers of Differentiated Products.” 44 The Journal of Industrial 
Economics. 4, 409-413 (1996).    
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  Beyond these difficulties, and importantly, in order to apply the consumer welfare standard 
the analyst needs not simply an estimate of merger-specific efficiencies, but also an estimate of the 
anticipated merger-induced reduction in marginal cost. The practical difficulties of distinguishing 
between those cost savings that impact incremental salesBand thus will to some extent factor into 
future pricingBand those that are fixedBand hence are unlikely directly to affect the profit-
maximizing price, can be substantial.
36 In my experience, considerable resources tend to be spent 
(wasted?) by merging parties, by their consultants, by the competition authorities themselves, and 
by the courts in attempting to draw what would, under a total welfare standard, be a far less 
important distinction.   
 
  It might be argued that even if the costs of implementing a consumer welfare test are 
nontrivial, they are necessarily less than the cost of calculating the total welfare effect of a merger.  
Why?  Because calculating total welfare requires the analyst to do all of the above plus estimate 
and add in any fixed or marginal cost savings that will not be passed on to consumers. 
 
  While this is correct if one=s goal is to calculate precisely a merger=s total effect on welfare, 
it is not correct if one=s purpose is instead to determine whether total welfare is likely to increase.  
There will surely be many situations where the analyst would be able to conclude from the likely 
magnitude of merger-specific cost savings—whether marginal or fixed--that these benefits to 
society would exceed any plausible deadweight welfare loss.
37 In such cases, a total welfare 
standard would likely be far easier than a consumer welfare standard to apply.  Moreover, if one is 
unable to estimate with a reasonably high degree of confidence claimed efficiencies that benefit 
producers rather than consumers (such as, merger-specific fixed cost savings), it would not be 
inconsistent with the use of a total welfare standard to evaluate the merger largely on the basis of 
what one believes likely to be the effect on final consumers alone.  A total welfare standard may, 
therefore, not only be more desirable conceptually, but also less costly to implement. 
                                                 
35 To be sure, this may complicate considerably the analysis of a merger=s likely effects under any welfare standard.     
36  In addition, marginal cost savings will generally not be achieved immediately, implying a need properly to discount 
for the more distant effects on price.  While even fixed cost savings may take time to materialize, these at least tend to 
be Aone-time@ cost savings, implying less need to discount a stream of future benefits.    
37 Treating as welfare-neutral the pure transfer of surplus from consumers to producers from even a modest post-
merger price increase-which is what a total welfare standard would do-the deadweight loss from many mergers would 
often be quite small relative to any significant cost savings.  This, even after controlling for the factors that may have 
biased upwards the estimates contained in Williamson’s naïve model.  Moreover, as discussed in Roberts and Salop, 
firm-specific efficiencies generated by merger may, over time, “spill over” to the market as a whole as other firms in 
the economy gradually appropriate these benefits for themselves.  Gary L. Roberts and Steven C. Salop, “Efficiencies 





Welfare Standards and AThe First Theorem of Antitrust@ 
 
  Finally, one might argue that employing a consumer welfare standard is less costly because 
it lends itself to ready application of the so-called  AFirst Theorem of Antitrust@Bi.e., AIf consumers 
like it, the merger is procompetitive and should be permitted.  If they dislike it, the merger is 
anticompetitive and should be blocked.@  Because pure fixed cost savings do not translate into 
lower prices for consumers in the relevant markets impacted by a merger, and because a total 
welfare standard explicitly permits a tradeoff between harms to consumers and (potentially larger) 
gains to producers, determining from the Aviews of customers@ whether to challenge a merger 
provides at most only limited guidance under the total welfare standard.     
 
  The case for relying on Athe views of customers@ as a simple, shorthand, way of 
determining whether a merger is likely to enhance consumer welfare is not, however, anywhere as 
strong as some suggest.
38  Indeed, difficulties in applying this proxy are an important reason why 
competition authorities do not simply poll customers for their bottom-line views on a merger, but 
dig more deeply into the rationale behind customer views, where possible, examine Anatural 
experiments,@ and rely increasing on sophisticated empirical techniques--particularly econometric 
analysis.  These efforts tend to belie the claim of some that the First Theorem is a sure-fire and 
low-cost method of answering our ultimate questions.   
 
  Why can one not readily determine from Athe views of customers@ whether a merger is 
likely to satisfy the consumer welfare standard?  The reasons are several.  For one thing, typically 
there are many consumers with different demands and tastes.  Polling a segment of them, 
particularly if price discrimination is not feasible and the sampled group are inframarginal, will not 
necessarily determine whether a merger is likely to produce a reduction in consumer welfare.  
Second, where the merger threatens potentially to raise price to each consumer by only a relatively 
small dollar amount, consumers are unlikely to have given serious thought to the question; they 
will rationally have found it unprofitable to invest in obtaining the information relevant to 
developing a strong and informed opinion. 
 
  Also very important is the fact that many, perhaps even most, mergers that come before 
competition authorities involve inputs, not final products.  The immediate consumers of these 
inputs, and the ones most frequently quizzed about the merger=s likely impact, are not themselves 
final consumers.  Unfortunately, the effects on some, or even all, of these customers can be quite 
different from the effects on the ultimate, Afinal,@ consumers to whom they sell.   Purchasers of 
intermediate goods frequently employ different production techniques in turning out competing 
                                                 
38 For a fuller discussion of the issues presented in this section, see Heyer, “Theories and Conjectures: What Can We 
Learn From the Views of Consumers?” (Forthcoming).  
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final goods.  To the extent that some of these producers rely less heavily on a particular input than 
do others, the impact on the former group may be positive even if a merger threatens to raise the 
incremental costs for that firm and its rivals.  In effect, firms that face relatively small cost 
increases may benefit on net from the fact that consumers shift towards them and away from 
competitors whose costs have increased even more.
 39 
 
  In addition, where final demand is inelastic and pass-through is likely to be nearly 
complete, intermediate goods customers may (correctly) believe that they will not be very much 
harmed by even a substantial post-merger increase in the price of what they buy.  Final consumers, 
of course, are unambiguously harmed.  Moreover, purchasers of intermediate goods who 
themselves already have substantial stocks of the inputBeither warehoused, or incorporated into 
final products not yet soldBmay benefit from the higher incremental costs now faced by all from 
expanding and/or entering their markets.  Again, final consumers would be left worse off, even as 
some (or even all) intermediate good producers benefit. 
 
  Finally, in some circumstances pass-through of a cost increase will be greater than one 
hundred percent,
40 and economists have shown that, depending on final demand conditions, higher 
marginal costs may actually increase the profits of intermediate goods customers.
41 The take-away 
from all of this is not that the views of customers are irrelevant in determining the likely effects of 
a merger.  Rather, it is that the translation from consumer views to implementation of even a 
consumer welfare standard is often far from a simple task.
42   
 
  All of this having been said, employing a total welfare standard would not be an easy 
matter either.  Moreover, for reasons I now discuss, strict adherence to a total welfare standard 
would potentially lead to approval of a number of mergers whose likely effect on consumers is 
significantly negative. 
    
 
                                                 
39 For one famous instance of a strategic effort by some firms to raise their rivals’ costs as well as their own, see Oliver 
Williamson, “Wage Rates as a Barrier to Entry: The Pennington Case in Perspective”, 82 Q.J. ECON. 1, 85-116 
(1968).   
40 For example, this is an implication of Cournot competition  
41 See Sheldon Kimmel. “Effects of Cost Changes on Oligopolists' Profits.” 40 The Journal of Industrial Economics. 4, 
441-449 (1992).   For an analysis of circumstances under which intermediate goods customers may be harmed even as 
consumers benefit, see Daniel P. O'Brien & Greg Shaffer. “Bargaining, bundling, and clout: the portfolio effects of 
horizontal mergers.” Working Paper (July 2004). 
42 It is worth mentioning also, that while final consumers are an excellent source of information about their own 
demands they cannot generally be expected to opine intelligently on other factors relevant to whether a merger will 
prove anticompetitive.  In particular, it is not at all obvious that individual consumers will have reliable knowledge as 
to a proposed merger’s prospects for generating merger-specific efficiencies, or whether in the face of a possible 





  Distributional considerations raise at least two separate and distinct issues.  The first is 
whether pure transfers among groups in society should be considered in merger policy.  Again, the 
statute is silent on this issue. 
 
  Even if we were to grant that wealth distribution considerations are an appropriate focus of 
antitrust policy, would this provide clear support for use of a consumer welfare standard?     Are we 
confident of the presumption that consumers impacted adversely by a merger are less wealthy than 
owners of the firms that may be achieving cost savings in addition to the consumer surplus they are 
diverting?  Surely not all mergers are likely to have this effect, and we should therefore consider the 
potentially enormous costs of calculating in any given case the net distributional effect from 
employing a consumer welfare standard. 
43 
 
  To see that anticompetitive mergers need not have an adverse distributional impact, consider 
a proposed merger of all Mercedes Benz repair shops in a relevant geographic market.  Assume that 
entry into the market is strictly prohibited; perhaps because of zoning restrictions enacted to prevent 
noise or congestion, or perhaps explicitly to protect these firms from additional competition.  Under 
this fact pattern, should the antitrust authorities challenge the merger if our best economic analysis 
concluded that, post-merger(s), the profit-maximizing price for repairing Mercedes Benz 
automobiles would rise by 25%?   Typically, one would think, a challenge would be appropriate, 
and that authorities should not be required first to determine whether the Adeadweight@ loss from a 
merger-induced price increase would be offset by a socially beneficial wealth transfer from rich 
automobile owners towards service station owners.
44 
 
  Beyond the question of whether it is desirable in theory to take into account distributional 
effects,
45 it is not clear that one can at low cost confidently predict even the direction, much less the 
magnitude, of a merger’s distributional consequences.  The owners of publicly traded corporations 
proposing to merge in an effort to capture savings not fully passed on to consumers are quite often 
an ordinary cross section of Americans, and doubtless include the life savings of retirees, as well as 
                                                 
43 Insert appropriate quote from Superior Propane. 
44 If station owners are generally poorer than their customers, should station owner cartels be permitted?  Should they 
be encouraged to form? 
45 Arnold Harberger, in a recent paper, offers a plea for economists to accept as part of their “conventional framework 
for applied welfare economics,” the postulate that “when evaluating the net benefits or costs of a given action (project, 
program, or policy), the costs and benefits accruing to each member of the relevant group (e.g., a nation) should 
normally be added without regard to the individual(s) to whom they accrue.”  Arnold Harberger, “Three Basic 
Postulates for Applied Welfare Economics:  An Interpretive Essay” pp. 785-797, Journal of Economic Literature 
(2001).     
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the proverbial widows and orphans.
46  Moreover, it is far from clear that the consumers of the 
products sold by firms proposing to merge operations in markets where competitive concerns arise 
are disproportionately in the lower wealth brackets.  Finally, determining with any degree of 
confidence the impact on particular consumer groups from mergers in intermediate goods markets is 
likely to be even more difficult. 
 
  While a policy requiring calculations of not only the likely price effects, but also the likely 
distributional consequences of mergers would doubtless contribute significantly to the wealth of 
economic consultants and experts, the benefits to society from incurring these costs seem highly 
questionable.  And if we are not even sure what a standard’s distributional consequences are, it 
seems hard to justify use of that standard on the basis of its (unknown) distributional consequences. 
It is hardly obvious that a decision on whether to block a merger ought to depend in any way on 
whether, for example, service station owners are, on average, wealthier than their customers (or vice-
versa).  And even if it were costless to determine whether the consumers or the producers affected by 
a merger are wealthier, surely questions of wealth distribution are better handled through broad-
based tax and subsidy programs, rather than via antitrust policy.
47 
 
  Finally, and importantly, a merger policy that contributes to the overall size and growth of 
the economy generates  larger total wealthBand at least part of the proceeds can, if society wishes, be 
used by fiscal authorities to aid, through targeted taxation and spending programs, those deemed to 
be most needy, or otherwise most deserving. 
 
Some Additional Considerations  
 
  a. The Costs of Rent-Seeking Behavior 
  Economists have long known that competition can at times be wasteful.  That is to say, one 
really can have Atoo much of a good thing.@  What does it mean to say, as a matter of economics, that 
something is Aexcessive@?  Conduct can sensibly be defined as excessive when it is being engaged in 
past the point at which, from the standpoint of society as a whole, the value it adds is greater than its 
cost.
48 Pollution is one commonly used example of where negative externalities may be imposed by 
manufacturers on residents who are not compensated for harms they suffer.  In such cases, it is easy 
                                                 
46 In addition, producer surplus, when not “passed through” to consumers in the form of lower prices, may be shared to 
some extent with suppliers of the firm’s inputs—including labor. 
47  In any event, it seems very likely that the effect of even the most anticompetitive merger on the total wealth of 
individual consumers would be quite small.  Raising by even 50% the price paid by the relatively poor for products 
impacted adversely by mergersBmuch less by only those mergers where shifting to a total welfare standard is likely to 
change the enforcement decisionBseems unlikely to have a very great impact on their wealth. 
48 The maintained assumption is that rational actors engage only in conduct whose benefits to them are expected to 
exceed the costs to them.  
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to show that an activityBin this case, production by the manufacturersBmay well proceed past the 
point at which its net value to the economy is positive.  
 
  Competition itself can in some cases create a negative externalityBan uncompensated 
harmBthat results in excessive entry or excessive product differentiation.  The negative externality in 
these cases is felt not by consumers, but by incumbent producers.  Nevertheless, it can result in entry 
and competition that, while beneficial to consumers in the market, is wasteful to the economy as a 
whole.
49   
 
  Consider for example a market in which incumbent firms are earning significant margins 
and positive margins will remain even following competitive entry.  In such cases, potential 
entrants will find that the costs of entering will be partly covered by revenues on business that the 
entrant Asteals@ from incumbents.  To the extent that business can be stolen without a substantial cut 
in price (or improvement in quality), the benefits to consumers may fall far short of the associated 
costsBin particular, the fixed costs of entry.
50 
 
  Part of what makes entry into a market profitable can be the margins that are shifted from 
incumbents to the entrant.  From the standpoint of society as a whole, however, these are merely 
transfers from one firm to another.  Nevertheless, the prospect of capturing these margins can in 
some instances make entry profitable, despite the fact that, from the standpoint of the economy as a 
hole, entry does not pass a cost-benefit test.
51 In addition to investments in entry, investments in 
product differentiation can, for similar Abusiness stealing@ reasons, be wasteful as well.
52 
                                                 
49 Antitrust scholars, most notably Richard Posner, have argued that the drive to obtain market power can transform 
rents into costs.  Posner, Richard,“The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation,” 83 J. Pol. Econ.  (1975).  Whatever 
the power of this logic in general, the argument appears to have questionable applicability to mergers in particular.  As 
Williamson summarizes after responding to this argument in some detail in his “Economies as an Antitrust Defense 
Revisited,” 
 
“Plausibility standards plainly vary.  Those who are easily persuaded that managers enjoy extensive 
insularity [from stockholder control], that managers fully credentialize on the basis of low probability 
events, and that the marginal utility of money is fairly constant will conclude that exhaustive ex ante 
rent transformation occurs in the merger context, as required by Posner’s theory.  On the other hand, 
those who are skeptical of any of these assumptions will conclude that rent transformation will be 
incomplete.  As for myself, I believe that the insularity assumption is the most doubtful.  Absent this 
assumption, the entire argument collapses.” [718] 
  
50 It is hard to imagine there being a serious competitive problem with a merger of two or more of the many high-price 
coffee shops located within walking distance of my office in downtown Washington, DC, and I admit to wondering 
whether some of the fixed costs incurred from all of this entry might not be wasteful from the standpoint of society as a 
whole. 
51 See Gregory N. Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, “Free Entry and Social Inefficiency,” 17 RAND J. Econ. 48, 55-57 




  These considerations suggest a theoretical case for actually prohibiting entry at times, 
though it is worth mentioning also that, in theory, markets can suffer equally from insufficient 
entry.
53 The antitrust laws are not employed to keep out competitive entry, nor would many propose 
that they be used for that purpose.
54 Consumers in markets where even Aexcess@ entry occurs clearly 
benefit.  The benefits include not only lower prices, but also the prospect for highly valued variety 
and better products, not to mention the incentive that the entry threat provides for incumbents to 
minimize costs and identify and satisfy consumer demands.  Determining ex ante whether the costs 




  Given how costlyBand potentially harmfulBit may be to implement a total welfare standard 
that takes these theoretical possibilities into account, one could argue that it would be best, all 
things considered, simply to stick with a consumer welfare standard.  And yet, the difficulties of 
administering a total welfare standard do not seem so large, or so Awelfare-standard-specific@ that 
they offset the strong case for using what is otherwise a far more desirable welfare criterion.   
Determining whether a merger is likely to raise total welfare requires an estimate of a) the merger=s 
effect on allocative efficiency via the ability of firms profitably to raise price (or otherwise harm 
consumers of their products) and b) the cost savings, if any, that are specific to the merger.  In 
                                                                                                                                                                  
product markets. See also Michael Spence. “Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition,” 43 Review 
of Economic Studies, 217-236 (1976a) and A.K. Dixit & J.E. Stiglitz. “Monopolistic Competition and Optimal Product 
Diversity,” 67 American Economic Review, 297-308 (1977) which discuss the possibility of free entry resulting in too 
little entry relative to the social optimum in a monopolistically competitive market. Finally, see Chiang-Tai Hsieh & 
Enrico Moretti. “Can Free Entry Be Inefficient? Fixed Commissions and Social Waste in the Real Estate Industry,” 111 
Journal of Political Economy. 5, 1076-1122 (2003) which attempts empirically to estimate the cost of excess entry into 
the Real Estate Industry. 
52  See Michael Spence. “Product Differentiation and Welfare,” 66 American Economy Review, 407-414 (1976b). See 
also Steven C. Salop & Jeffrey M. Perloff. “Firm-Specific Information, Product Differentiation, and Industry 
Equilibrium.” 38 Oxford Economic Papers, New Series. Supplement: Strategic Behaviour and Industrial Competition, 
184-202 (1986), and Dixit & Stiglitz, ibid. 
53 See, for example, Chaim Fershtman and Ariel Pakes, "A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars." 31 
RAND J. Econ. 2, 207-236 (2000).  There, the authors show that where fixed costs are significant, marginal costs are 
low, and post-entry pricing is Bertrand, total welfare can be enhanced by permitting post-entry collusion.  In certain 
circumstances total welfare can be enhanced also by having the government subsidize entry or limit the freedom of an 
incumbent to respond to an entrant’s lower prices.  See, for example, Aaron S. Edlin and Joseph Farrell, “The American 
Airlines Case: A Chance to Clarify Predation Policy” UC Berkeley Competition Policy Center Working Paper No. 
CPC02-33 (November 2002).  
54 The argument that entry should be prohibited on grounds that its costs exceed its benefits has, however, been 
employed in regulatory proceedings-typically by incumbents claiming to be natural monopolies.  See, for example, Paul 
W. MacAvoy, Daniel F. Spulber and Bruce E. Stangle. “Is Competitive Entry Free? Bypass and Partial Deregulation in 
Natural Gas Markets.” 6 Yale Journal on Regulation, 209-248 (1989). 
55 Numerous economic studies have documented the substantial costs of having regulators determine when entry ought 
to be permitted [CITES].       
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principle, the analyst needs to evaluate these two effects and calculate their net welfare effect under 
either a consumer, or a total welfare standard.
56   
 
 b.  Transparency 
  One might agree with the policy proposal put forward in this paper--that competition 
authorities should be employing a total welfare standardByet also feel that if a change is to be made, 
it would be best that it not be made very publicly or transparently.  A formal policy change of this 
type could well generate considerable flak and controversy.  Might it be best, all things considered, 
to implement it through the use of prosecutorial discretion not to bring wrong or difficult cases?   
 
  Apart from objections in principle to the idea that open debate should be discouraged 
because the public would simply not support such a change, there are a number of practical adverse 
consequences from being less than candid about the standard that the competition agencies will 
apply.  For one thing, if parties do not know that certain types of efficiencies are going to be 
credited by the authorities, they are far less likely to present the types of evidence and analysis 
required for those efficiencies to be credited.  For another, in some circumstances the government 
may elect to file a case and the defendants will present to the court an efficiency justification that 
would in theory be credited under a total welfare standard, but which would not be credited under a 
consumer welfare standard.  If total welfare is not the standard officially employed by antitrust 
officials, one can expect government prosecutors and their experts to argue strenuously that benefits 
unlikely to be fully passed through to consumers in the relevant markets of concern Ado not count.@  
This would be, in my view, unfortunate, and may help lead a court to rule in favor of the plaintiff 
wrongly, or at least for the wrong reasons.  It may also complicate the ability of authorities to 
implicitly credit savings in producer surplus and appropriately to exercise prosecutorial discretion 




  More and more antitrust practitioners, both here and abroad, have expressed an interest in 
incorporating into merger analysis the effects of merger-generated efficiencies.  The analysis in this 
article argues that if we are going to do it
57, we might as well do it right, and that use of a total 
                                                 
56 As discussed in Ken Heyer. “A World of Uncertainty: Economics and the Globalization of Antitrust.”  (2005), an 
optimal policy under conditions of uncertainty would take into account the costs of both Type I and Type II errors.  
Decisions would be made based on the expected value of a merger=s effect on welfare, not simply a point estimate. 
 
57 Some serious antitrust scholars, including Richard Posner and Robert Bork, have concluded that explicit case-by-case 
consideration of merger-specific efficiencies, and by implication the use of an “efficiencies defense,” is simply too  
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welfare standard appears to be not only the theoretically best standard to employ, but also one that 
can be employed with no significant increase in administrative costs.  
 
  And there is a somewhat broader point worth making.  Use of a consumer welfare standard 
in antitrust inherently casts consumers as those who count, and producers as those who don’t.  This 
is unfortunate, in my view, for reasons that go well beyond those laid out in this article.  For one 
thing, producers, it bears remembering, happen also to be consumers.  Indeed, they’ve been seen 
shopping after work, and on their days off.   Moreover, there seems good reason to value the 
welfare of those who produce what we consume as highly as those who do the consuming. 
 
  Defense of a welfare standard that ignores the welfare of producers contributes to a 
perception that producers exist only to benefit those to whom they sell, and that the welfare of those 
actually doing the producing-often at significant cost and risk--is itself of no value.  It thus 
contributes to a mind set that favors all manner of efficiency-reducing policies to benefit select 
groups of consumers at the expense of producers, despite the negative effect such policies have on 
overall economic welfare-certainly in the long run, and often in the short run as well.  
 
  Quite apart from whatever economic benefits would result from putting antitrust policy on a 













                                                                                                                                                                  
difficult to conduct in practice and should therefore not be a formal part of merger analysis and litigation.   See Richard 
A. Posner, Antitrust Law, 2
nd Edition.  University of Chicago Press (2001).  Bork, op.ci.t, see fn 8.  